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All Substantial Rights Doctrine in 
Action 
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Christopher J. Morten† 
This Article provides an overview of the Federal Circuit’s all 
substantial rights doctrine. Surveying decades of case law, this 
Article seeks to clarify this confusing area of the law and set out 
the essential rules for those engaged in patent licensing, patent 
assignment, and patent litigation. This Article begins by explaining 
why effective ownership of a patent is critical to standing, and then 
describes the framework through which courts determine whether 
a party is, in fact, in possession of all substantial rights and is 
therefore the effective owner. While there are many factors that 
courts may consider, certain rights take priority in this analysis, 
the right to enforce being the most important. This Article 
concludes by providing guidance on how to structure an 
agreement to ensure that these rights are allocated predictably and 
reliably to convey effective ownership of the patent. 
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Board, patent prosecution, and patent strategy and counseling. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The owner of a patent may sue for infringement of that patent.1 
This rule is easily applicable when the patent has been granted to a 
single party and the rights were never transferred to another. 
However, the question of ownership becomes more complicated 
when the rights have been sold or licensed. This is particularly true 
if, as is common today, an assignment involves the division of the 
rights in a particular patent among more than one party.2 In this 
situation, the framework to identify the true patent owner or 
owners, who must be a plaintiff in the infringement lawsuit to 
establish standing, is known as the “all substantial  
rights” analysis.3 
As this Article explains below, the all substantial rights 
standard is simple in theory: a party that possesses all of the 
substantial rights in a patent is the effective patent owner, with 
standing to bring an infringement suit in its own name.4 A party 
that possesses less than all substantial rights in the patent is not the 
effective patent owner and must join the patent owner if it brings 
suit.5 Yet the standard can be tricky in practice. When determining 
whether a particular party is effectively the patent owner with 
standing to bring suit on its own, courts, including the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, have tended to characterize 
their analysis as a totality of the circumstances, case-by-case 
balancing of factors.6 These rather complex opinions make it 
                                                                                                             
1 See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012). 
2 See, e.g., Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 
1354, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
3 See id. at 1359–60. 
4 See id. at 1359. 
5 See, e.g., Propat Int’l Corp. v. RPost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
6 See, e.g., Alfred E. Mann, 604 F.3d at 1360–61 (“Our prior decisions have never 
purported to establish a complete list of the rights whose holders must be examined to 
determine whether a licensor has transferred away sufficient rights to render an exclusive 
licensee the owner of a patent. But we have listed at least some of the rights that should 
be examined.”); AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med., LLC, 582 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (“While any of these restrictions alone might not have been destructive of the 
transfer of all substantial rights, their totality is sufficient to do so.”); Sicom Sys. Ltd. v. 
Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[W]e must assess the 
Agreement at issue, weighing the rights in the patent transferred to Sicom against those 
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difficult to elucidate black-letter rules. However, over time, certain 
patterns have emerged.7 Parties negotiating the transfer of patent 
rights require confidence that they can structure an agreement to 
ensure that all substantial rights reside where the parties intend. 
This can be achieved by following a few guiding principles set 
forth below.8 
Part I of this Article introduces the doctrines of constitutional 
and prudential standing and explores why effective patent 
ownership is necessary for a party to bring a patent infringement 
suit in its own name. Part II explains the metaphor of a patent as a 
“bundle of rights,”9 each of which can be individually sold, 
licensed, or otherwise transferred. This Part also introduces the 
Federal Circuit’s “all substantial rights” analysis, which weighs the 
rights within the bundle possessed by a particular party in order to 
determine whether that party possesses all substantial rights (and 
therefore constitutes the effective patent owner, with standing to 
sue in its own name). Part III shows that for a party to qualify as 
the effective patent owner, the party must possess a right to 
practice the patent. Part IV provides a survey of the Federal 
Circuit’s implementation of the all substantial rights analysis and 
illuminates the individual rights within the “bundle” that the 
Federal Circuit has identified as most important: first and foremost, 
the right to enforce, followed by the right to alienate and the right 
to indulge infringement. Part V shows that while other rights 
within the bundle may be considered by courts, they tend to be less 
important and rarely or never dispositive. Part VI concludes by 
showing that it is the substance, and not the form, of an agreement 
transferring patent rights that controls the all substantial  
rights analysis. 
                                                                                                             
retained by Canada, to determine whether Canada assigned all substantial rights in the 
patent, or fewer than all such rights.”). 
7 See infra Parts III–VI. 
8 See infra Parts III–VI. 
9 See infra text accompanying notes 44–45. 
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I. WHY PATENT OWNERSHIP MATTERS: THE PROBLEM  
OF STANDING 
What drives the concern over who owns a patent? Ownership is 
critical because only a party in possession of the exclusionary 
rights conferred by the Patent Act is injured by infringement of the 
patent.10 Only the owner of all substantial rights in the patent may 
bring suit on its own, without joining another plaintiff (or 
plaintiffs).11 This issue often arises in the analysis of a plaintiff’s 
rights as an exclusive licensee,12 but it can also involve the division 
of patent rights along other lines, such as those enumerated later in 
Part III. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
explained that there are two distinct types of standing requirements 
that must be met for a party to sue on its own: constitutional 
standing and prudential standing.13 
A. Constitutional Standing 
Every court must determine whether the plaintiff has the right 
to bring its dispute before the court. “Article III, § 2 of the 
Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to ‘Cases’ or 
‘Controversies.’ The doctrine of constitutional standing serves to 
identify which disputes fall within these broad categories and 
therefore may be resolved by a federal court.”14 “For a party to 
establish constitutional standing, it must ‘show that the conduct of 
                                                                                                             
10 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1), 281 (2012); Propat, 473 F.3d at 1193 (“A party 
that is neither the legal owner of the patent nor the transferee of all substantial rights in 
the patent still has standing to sue for infringement if that party has a legally protected 
interest in the patent created by the Patent Act, so that it can be said to suffer legal injury 
from an act of infringement.”). 
11 See, e.g., Alfred E. Mann, 604 F.3d at 1359–60. 
12 See, e.g., Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1350–51 
(Fed. Cir. 2016); AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med., LLC, 582 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009); Sicom Sys. Ltd. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 978–79 (Fed. Cir. 
2005); Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875  
(Fed. Cir. 1991). 
13 See Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also 
13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531  
(3d ed. 2018) (“Standing requirements have been drawn from two sources, constitutional 
and prudential.”). 
14 WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 1257, 1263–64 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. III, § 2). 
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which [it] complains has caused [it] to suffer an “injury in fact” 
that a favorable judgment will redress.’”15 The Supreme Court has 
characterized the necessary “injury in fact” as “an invasion of a 
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; 
and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or 
“hypothetical.”’”16 
In the context of patent infringement litigation, the plaintiff’s 
injury is created by statute. Under 35 U.S.C. § 154(a), every patent 
grants to the patentee “the right to exclude others from making, 
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the 
United States or importing the invention into the United States.”17 
The Federal Circuit has “explained that a party has the right to sue 
for infringement of the patent ‘if that party has a legally protected 
interest in the patent created by the Patent Act, so that it can be 
said to suffer legal injury from [the] act of infringement.’”18 
“Because the Patent Act creates the legally protected interests in 
dispute, the right to assert infringement of those interests comes 
from the Act itself.”19 
WiAV Solutions LLC v. Motorola, Inc. and other Federal 
Circuit decisions recognize that an exclusive licensee has 
constitutional standing to sue an infringer.20 However, this is 
merely a first step, as constitutional standing suffices to bring suit 
but does not, on its own, suffice to bring suit alone. As this Article 
explains below, additional prudential standing concerns dictate 
that, pursuant to the Patent Act, “[u]nlike the patentee or the 
transferee of all substantial rights in the patent . . . a [mere] 
exclusive licensee ordinarily may not sue in its own name alone, 
                                                                                                             
15 Id. at 1264 (alteration in original) (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 
542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004)). 
16 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v. 
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). 
17 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012); see also id. § 271(a). Notably, “[a] patentee shall have 
remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.” Id. § 281. 
18 WiAV, 631 F.3d at 1264 (alteration in original) (quoting Propat Int’l Corp. v. RPost, 
Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
19 Id. at 1264–65. 
20 See id.; see also, e.g., Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1340  
(Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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but must join the patent owner in an action brought against an 
accused infringer.”21 
B. Prudential Standing 
Understanding the all substantial rights doctrine requires an 
appreciation of the concept of “prudential standing”—even if the 
requirements of constitutional standing are met, a court may deny 
standing when, for prudential reasons, it decides that a plaintiff’s 
case does not warrant a decision on the merits.22 Supreme Court 
precedent concerning issues of standing has articulated certain 
prudential factors that limit who can bring suit,23 known as the 
“prudential standing” doctrine.24 As the Supreme Court stated in 
Allen v. Wright: 
Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-
imposed limits on the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a 
litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the 
rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances 
more appropriately addressed in the representative 
branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                             
21 Propat, 473 F.3d at 1193. 
22 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3531; see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. 2675, 2685 (2013) (noting that prudential standing “embodies ‘judicially self-imposed 
limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction’” (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004))). 
23 E.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 12 (“Although we have not 
exhaustively defined the prudential dimensions of the standing doctrine, we have 
explained that prudential standing encompasses ‘the general prohibition on a litigant’s 
raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized 
grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the 
requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the 
law invoked.’” (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), abrogated by 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386, 1388 (2014))). 
24 Some commentators have questioned the continued vitality of the prudential 
standing doctrine, as distinct from the core requirements of constitutional standing, in 
view of the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Lexmark International. 134 S. Ct. at 1386, 
1388 (holding that courts “cannot limit a cause of action that Congress has created merely 
because ‘prudence’ dictates”). However, after Lexmark International, the Federal Circuit 
has continued to ground the all substantial rights framework in prudential standing.  
See, e.g., Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1349–50 n.3 
(Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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complaint fall within the zone of interests protected 
by the law invoked.25 
In the context of patent infringement, several prudential 
concerns come into play. These concerns underlie the rule that an 
exclusive licensee who does not have all substantial rights in the 
patent ordinarily may not sue in its own name alone.26 One 
prudential concern is that an infringement suit brought by an 
exclusive licensee alone risks invalidating or otherwise 
undermining the value of the patent, thereby harming the interests 
of the missing patent owner(s): “[A] patent should not be placed at 
risk of invalidation by the licensee without the participation of the 
patentee.”27 The Supreme Court identified another prudential 
concern, the risk of subjecting defendants to multiple suits for the 
same act of infringement.28 Obliging an exclusive licensee “with 
less than all substantial rights, such as a field of use licensee, to 
join the patentee before initiating suit” reduces this risk.29 The 
Federal Circuit has further noted, as a corollary to the risk of 
subjecting a defendant to multiple suits, the risk “of  
inconsistent relief.”30 
Notably, concerns over assuring representation of all rights 
holders, avoiding repeated litigation, and avoiding inconsistent 
judgments are the same concerns that underlie Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 19, which broadly governs the required joinder of 
parties in federal court.31 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has, at 
times—if not consistently—entwined its standing analysis with 
Rule 19 and the concept of joinder of a necessary and 
                                                                                                             
25 468 U.S. at 751. 
26 See, e.g., Textile Prods., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 134 F.3d 1481, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
27 Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Paddock Labs., Inc., 504 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
28 See Int’l Gamco, Inc. v. Multimedia Games, Inc., 504 F.3d 1273, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (first citing Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 494 (1850); then citing Pope 
Mfg. Co. v. Gormully & Jeffery Mfg. Co., 144 U.S. 248, 251–52 (1892); and then citing 
Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24, 38 (1923)). 
29 Id. 
30 E.g., A123 Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-Quebec, 626 F.3d 1213, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
31 See, e.g., Howard P. Fink, Indispensable Parties and the Proposed Amendment to 
Federal Rule 19, 74 YALE L.J. 403, 414–22 (1965); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 19 
(governing “Required Joinder of Parties”). 
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indispensable party. For example, A123 Systems, Inc. v. Hydro-
Quebec expressly connects prudential standing with Rule 19: 
Under long-standing prudential standing precedent, 
an exclusive licensee with less than all substantial 
rights in a patent, such as a field-of-use licensee, 
lacks standing to sue for infringement without 
joining the patent owner. In general, as we discuss 
below, an accused infringer must likewise join both 
the exclusive licensee and the patentee in a 
declaratory action because the patentee is a 
necessary party.32 
The Federal Circuit has held that a patent owner is almost 
always at least a necessary party to an infringement suit under Rule 
19(a), so long as joinder is “feasible.”33 However, the court has 
also cautioned that standing and Rule 19 joinder are two distinct 
analyses, and there is no “per[ ]se rule that patent owners are 
automatically indispensable parties—there is no patent-specific 
exception to Rule 19(b).”34 Alfred E. Mann Foundation for 
Scientific Research v. Cochlear Corp. recognized that “when a 
necessary patent owner is not joined, even when Rule 19(a) is 
satisfied, the court must still perform the inquiry under Rule 19(b) 
to determine whether that owner is indispensable.”35 
                                                                                                             
32 626 F.3d at 1217 (citations omitted). A123 relies on an earlier Federal Circuit 
decision, Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 1998), which 
expressly invoked Rule 19. A123 Sys., 626 F.3d at 1217 (“Having found Geapag to be 
without standing for failing to join the patentee, it follows that the court lacks jurisdiction 
over Enzo’s declaratory judgment claims under [FED. R. CIV. P.] 19 for nonjoinder.” 
(citing Enzo APA, 134 F.3d at 1094)). 
33 Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft Zur Forderung Der Wissenschaften E.V., 
734 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. (citing Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 
1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 
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C. Additional Comments on Standing and the Origins of the All 
Substantial Rights Doctrine 
A party has standing to sue in its own name only when it is the 
effective owner of a patent; i.e., when it possesses all substantial 
rights in the patent. As the Federal Circuit has explained: 
Either the licensor did not transfer “all substantial 
rights” to the exclusive licensee, in which case the 
licensor remains the owner of the patent and retains 
the right to sue for infringement, or the licensor did 
transfer “all substantial rights” to the exclusive 
licensee, in which case the licensee becomes the 
owner of the patent for standing purposes and gains 
the right to sue on its own. In either case, the 
question is whether the license agreement 
transferred sufficient rights to the exclusive licensee 
to make the licensee the owner of the patents in 
question. If so, the licensee may sue but the licensor 
may not. If not, the licensor may sue, but the 
licensee alone may not.36 
Ultimately, “the question is ‘who owns the patent’? Does the 
transfer or retention of certain rights amount to an assignment of 
the patent or not?”37 
The remainder of this Article discusses the “all substantial 
rights” standard, as articulated by the Federal Circuit, and provides 
several practical tips for structuring the transfer of patent rights. 
Before diving into the substance, this Article makes a few 
additional points. First, the question of whether a party possesses 
all substantial rights in a patent and therefore constitutes the 
patentee, able to bring suit independently, is a question of law 
controlled by Federal Circuit precedent, rather than precedents of 
the regional circuits.38 Second, because the question of patent 
                                                                                                             
36 Alfred E. Mann, 604 F.3d at 1359–60. 
37 Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
38 See WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 1257, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Bd. 
of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832, 840 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The Federal Circuit ‘defers to the law of the regional circuits on 
matters of procedural law that do not implicate issues of patent law.’” (emphasis added) 
2018] STANDING WITH A BUNDLE OF STICKS 487 
 
ownership ultimately governs the question of standing, a 
jurisdictional issue, the all substantial rights issue can be raised at 
any time.39 Indeed, if it perceives a potential standing issue, a court 
has the power to address the question of patent ownership  
sua sponte.40 
Third, the question of patent ownership is important in almost 
every transfer of patent rights. As indicated by the cases discussed 
below, effective transfer of patent ownership requires more than 
simple transfer of title. Indeed, as discussed in more detail in Part 
VI, the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have reiterated that 
form does not control.41 An agreement that purports to “reassign” 
ownership of a patent from an assignor to a new assignee may not 
actually transfer ownership if the new assignee does not obtain the 
requisite rights.42 On the flip side, an agreement that purports to be 
a mere license preserving ownership in the hands of the licensor 
may, for all intents and purposes, make the licensee the effective 
patent owner.43 For this reason, throughout the discussion that 
follows, this Article refers generically to a “buyer” and “seller” of 
patent rights, rather than “licensor”/“licensee” or 
“assignor”/“assignee.” The “buyer” and “seller” may also be 
viewed as the “transferee” and “transferor,” respectively, of the 
patent rights. 
                                                                                                             
(quoting Duro-Last, Inc. v. Custom Seal, Inc., 321 F.3d 1098, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2003))), 
aff’d, 563 U.S. 776 (2011). 
39 See Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device All., Inc., 240 F.3d 1016, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (“[T]he issue of whether an exclusive licensee has sufficient rights in a patent to 
bring suit in its own name is jurisdictional and, therefore, is not waived by a party’s 
failure to raise the issue in the district court.”); see also, e.g., Evident Corp. v. Church & 
Dwight Co., 399 F. 3d 1310, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
40 See, e.g., AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med., LLC, 582 F.3d 1314, 1318  
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
41 See Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 256 (1891); A123 Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-
Quebec, 626 F.3d 1213, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
42 See, e.g., Diamond Coating Techs., LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., 823 F.3d 615, 618 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1117 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996)). 
43 See, e.g., Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1351 
(Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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II. THE “BUNDLE OF RIGHTS” 
A patent confers a “bundle of rights” upon the patentee, and a 
patentee may choose to transfer any number of those rights to a 
licensee or assignee.44 The more substantial the rights obtained by 
the buyer (and, consequently, the less substantial the rights left 
with the seller), the more likely it is that a court will find that all 
substantial rights have been transferred.45 “Under Waterman [v. 
Mackenzie] and its successors, the critical determination regarding 
a party’s ability to sue in its own name is whether an agreement 
transferring patent rights to that party is, in effect, an assignment or 
a mere license.”46 
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that the determination of 
whether a party possesses all substantial rights in a patent is based 
on the allocation of rights at the time the complaint is filed.47 A 
defective agreement that intends but fails to transfer all substantial 
rights from seller to buyer cannot be cured by a later execution of a 
nunc pro tunc48 amended agreement. In Enzo v. Geapag, the 
Federal Circuit held that “nunc pro tunc assignments are not 
sufficient to confer retroactive standing.”49 Citing Enzo, the 
Federal Circuit held in Alps South, LLC v. Ohio Willow Wood Co. 
that the question of whether a licensee “may be considered a 
‘patentee’” turns on “whether the licensee possesses ‘all substantial 
rights’ at the time the complaint was filed.”50 
                                                                                                             
44 Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that a patent provides its owner with “a bundle of rights which 
may be divided and assigned, or retained in whole or part”). 
45 See, e.g., Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 
1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that in the licensing context, “the question is whether 
the license agreement transferred sufficient rights to the exclusive licensee to make the 
licensee the owner of the patents in question”). 
46 AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med., LLC, 582 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(citing the Supreme Court’s foundational decision in Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 
252 (1891)). 
47 See Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
48 See Nunc pro tunc, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “nunc pro 
tunc” as “[h]aving retroactive legal effect through a court’s inherent power”)  
(emphasis added). 
49 Enzo, 134 F.3d at 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). 
50 787 F.3d 1379, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis added) (citing Enzo, 134 F.3d at 
1093); see also Diamond Coating Techs. v. Hyundai Motor Am., 823 F.3d 615, 621 
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When addressing the question of whether a given agreement 
transfers all substantial rights in a patent, a court is free to examine 
any and all rights in the bundle.51 In its analysis, a court should 
“weigh[] the rights in the patent transferred to [the buyer] against 
those retained by [the seller], to determine whether [the seller] 
assigned all substantial rights in the patent, or fewer than all such 
rights.”52 The Federal Circuit has also encouraged courts to 
consider the parties’ intent in this analysis.53 
The Federal Circuit has stated that there is no single, 
exhaustive list of rights a court must consider “to determine 
whether a licensor has transferred away sufficient rights to render 
an exclusive licensee the owner of a patent.”54 While the Federal 
Circuit has “never purported to establish a complete list” of the 
rights that a court should consider,55 it has, over the years, 
articulated quite a few. These run the gamut from the most 
important rights, like the right to practice and enforce the patent, to 
relatively minor ones, like the right to let the patents expire for the 
nonpayment of maintenance fees.56 Among the rights that have 
been enumerated and considered by the Federal Circuit, the 
Authors have identified the following: 
(1) the right to make, import, use, and/or sell products covered 
by the patent; 
                                                                                                             
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (reaffirming the rule that “[n]unc pro tunc assignments are not sufficient 
to confer retroactive [patentee status]” (alteration in original) (quoting Alps S.,  
787 F.3d at 1384)). 
51 See Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
52 Sicom Sys. Ltd. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
53 E.g., id. at 979 (“[T]his court has established that the intention of the parties to the 
Agreement and the substance of what was granted are relevant factors in determining 
whether all substantial rights in a patent were conveyed.”); Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. 
Device All., Inc., 240 F.3d 1016, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A court] must ascertain the 
intention of the parties and examine the substance of what was granted . . . .”); Vaupel 
Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccania Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(“We must . . . examine whether the agreements transferred all substantial rights to the 
’650 patent and whether the surrounding circumstances indicated an intent to do so.”). 
54 Alfred E. Mann, 604 F.3d at 1360. 
55 See id. 
56 See generally Parts III–V. 
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(2) the right to enforce—i.e., to sue infringers; 
(3) the right to alienate rights and interests in the patent, 
through sale or other transfer; 
(4) the right to indulge infringement, and the related right to 
settle any infringement dispute; 
(5) the right to license or sublicense; 
(6) the right to supervise licensees; 
(7) the right to be informed and/or consulted in the event of 
litigation or licensing activity by the other party; 
(8) any reversionary right possessed by the seller; 
(9) the right to share in royalties or damages that flow from  
the patent; 
(10) the right to prosecute child applications and foreign 
counterparts; and 
(11) the obligation to pay maintenance fees and the right to let 
the patent expire for nonpayment of fees.57 
The Federal Circuit has never held that any particular right 
within the bundle is too small to merit consideration in the all 
substantial rights analysis.58 Moreover, at times, the Federal 
Circuit has suggested that no single right within the bundle is ever 
truly dispositive.59 However, two clear rules have emerged: (1) To 
                                                                                                             
57 See, e.g., Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1347, 
1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (considering rights 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, and 11 enumerated above); 
Alfred E. Mann, 604 F.3d at 1360–61 (considering rights 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11); 
Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(considering rights 1, 2, 5, and 8); Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of 
Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (considering rights 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 
and 9); Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 875 (considering rights 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10). 
58 Because courts are permitted to consider even relatively minor rights in their 
analysis, the “all substantial rights” analysis could have evolved into a quantitative 
analysis of who owns substantially all of the patent rights. See infra Part V. However, the 
Federal Circuit has tended to focus its analysis more qualitatively on the question of who 
owns the most substantial rights within the bundle. See supra note 57. 
59 See, e.g., AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med., LLC, 582 F.3d 1314, 1321 
(considering certain limits on a buyer and holding that “[w]hile any of these restrictions 
alone might not have been destructive of the transfer of all substantial rights, their totality 
is sufficient to do so”). 
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possess all substantial rights, a buyer must possess the right to 
practice the patent; and (2) assuming that precondition is met, the 
right to enforce the patent is usually dispositive. As this Article 
explains below, a party that lacks the right to enforce is very 
unlikely to possess all substantial rights, and therefore will be 
unable to establish that it possesses standing to sue for patent 
infringement in its own name. 
III. A PRECONDITION: THE BUYER’S RIGHT TO PRACTICE 
As noted in Part I, the right to practice the patent in full—that 
is, the right to make, use, offer to sell, sell, and import the patented 
invention—is a necessary but not always sufficient precondition 
for the transfer of all substantial rights.60 In its recent decision 
Diamond Coating Technologies, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America, 
the Federal Circuit considered an agreement that, inter alia, did 
“not even grant [the buyer] a right to practice the patents-in-suit” 
and held that, “in this respect, [the buyer] unquestionably failed to 
acquire all substantial rights.”61 
This rule dates back more than a century to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Waterman v. Mackenzie, which focused on the 
“right to make, use, and vend the invention or discovery.”62 
Waterman held that “the grant of an exclusive right . . . which does 
not include the right to make, and the right to use, and the right to 
sell, is not a grant of a title in the whole patent-right within the 
district, and is therefore only a license.”63 Waterman held that any 
subdivision of the individual rights that collectively make up the 
right to practice the patent—e.g., “a grant of ‘the exclusive right to 
make and use,’ but not to sell, patented machines”—would 
                                                                                                             
60 See supra Section I.A (explaining that an exclusive right to practice the invention is 
necessary for constitutional standing to bring an infringement suit, because it is violation 
of that exclusive right that creates an “injury” under the Patent Act). 
61 823 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
62 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891). 
63 Id. at 256. 
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necessarily mean that the buyer possessed, in effect, less than the 
whole patent.64 
In the context of standing, the injury that gives rise to the right 
to sue for patent infringement is the infringement of the right to 
practice the claimed invention that the patent confers.65 An 
exclusive right to practice the patent is a necessary precondition for 
injury under the Patent Act and for constitutional standing.66 “To 
be an exclusive licensee for standing purposes, a party must have 
received, not only the right to practice the invention within a given 
territory, but also the patentee’s express or implied promise that 
others shall be excluded from practicing the invention within that 
territory as well.”67 
The Federal Circuit has further held that certain restrictions on 
the buyer’s right to practice the patent preclude the transfer of all 
substantial rights68: First, a field-of-use restriction69 is “fatal” to the 
transfer of all substantial rights, even if the buyer’s right to practice 
                                                                                                             
64 Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 546, 548 (1872)). 
However, a territorial restriction on a buyer’s rights has been held not to preclude the 
transfer of all substantial rights, such that an exclusive territorial licensee may have 
standing to sue absent the patent owner. See id. at 256. According to Waterman, a full 
assignment of the patent, or assignment of “the exclusive right under the patent within 
and throughout a specified part of the United States,” will “vest[] in the assignee a title in 
so much of the patent itself, with a right to sue infringers,” so that the assignee may do so 
“in the name of the assignee alone.” Id.; see also Int’l Gamco, Inc. v. Multimedia Games, 
Inc., 504 F.3d 1273, 1276 (Fed Cir. 2007). 
65 See supra Part I. 
66 See supra Section I.A. As this Article explains in Part V.B below, a seller of a patent 
may retain a right to practice the patent as well as a limited right to sublicense the patent 
without preventing the buyer from enjoying an “exclusive” right to practice. See Alfred 
E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (“The first step is to determine whether the license is exclusive or nonexclusive, 
because [the licensee] would have no right to sue, even by joining [the patent owner], 
under a nonexclusive license agreement.”). 
67 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
68 See, e.g., Alps S., LLC v. Ohio Willow Wood Co., 787 F.3d 1379, 1383  
(Fed. Cir. 2015). 
69 Field-of-Use Restriction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
“field-of-use restriction” as “[a] license provision restricting the licensee’s use of the 
licensed property to a defined product or service market or to a designated  
geographical area”). 
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is otherwise exclusive and unencumbered.70 Second, a hard 
expiration date on the buyer’s rights, prior to expiration of the 
patent, also precludes transfer of all substantial rights. In Aspex 
Eyewear, the Federal Circuit held that a buyer that obtains rights 
“for only a fixed period of years . . . does not meet the all 
substantial rights standard.”71 
The scope of the buyer’s right to practice has rarely been the 
focus of the Federal Circuit’s all substantial rights analyses, and in 
many cases the right is presumed and not mentioned. An 
agreement need not expressly grant the buyer the right to 
practice—or enumerate the individual rights to make, use, sell, 
etc.—as the buyer’s right to practice may be (and often is) 
subsumed into a broader grant of all rights and interests in  
the patent.72 
An important consequence of the rule that all substantial rights 
require a right to practice—and a potentially helpful practice tip—
is that any agreement that purports to transfer to the buyer the 
exclusive right to enforce the patent (even absent participation by 
the seller), without also transferring the right to practice the patent, 
is insufficient to transfer all substantial rights (or to confer 
                                                                                                             
70 Alps S., 787 F.3d at 1383–84 (observing that “[p]recedent dictates that the original 
agreement’s field of use restriction is fatal to Alps’s argument that it had standing to file 
this action” without joining the patent owner, and holding that “[b]ecause the license 
restricted Alps’s rights in the ’109 patent to the field of prosthetic products, Alps lacked 
standing to pursue this litigation without naming AEI as a co-plaintiff”); see also Bard 
Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 776 F.3d 837, 843 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (observing that, among other encumbrances on the buyer’s rights, “there was a 
field of use restriction,” and holding that “[t]here was no basis . . . to conclude that [the 
seller] had transferred ‘all substantial rights’”); Int’l Gamco, Inc. v. Multimedia Games, 
Inc., 504 F.3d 1273, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating that the all substantial rights doctrine 
“compels an exclusive licensee with less than all substantial rights, such as a field of use 
licensee, to join the patentee before initiating suit”). 
71 Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2006); 
see also id. at 1342–43 (“By having rights for only a limited portion of the patent term, 
[the buyer] simply did not own the patent. It was merely an exclusive licensee without all 
substantial rights.”). 
72 See, e.g., Suffolk Techs. LLC v. AOL Inc., 910 F. Supp. 2d 850, 856 (E.D. Va. 
2012) (holding that an agreement’s transfer of the “entire right, title[,] and interest” in a 
patent implicitly included transfer of the “right to make, use, and sell the invention 
covered by” the patent (quoting contract language from the agreement at issue  
in the case)). 
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constitutional standing on the buyer): “A ‘right to sue’ provision 
within a license cannot, of its own force, confer standing on a bare 
licensee.”73 Hence, a buyer with the right to enforce, but without 
the right to practice, cannot show injury.74 
Finally, while the buyer’s right to practice must be exclusive 
with respect to third parties, a seller’s retained right to practice the 
patent does not necessarily preclude the transfer of all substantial 
rights, so long as the buyer’s right to practice is otherwise 
exclusive.75 The seller’s right to practice can be structured as a 
retained right, or can alternatively be structured as a license from 
the buyer back to the seller.76 This Article discusses this issue 
further in Section V.B. 
IV. THE HEART OF THE ALL SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS ANALYSIS: 
WEIGHING THE MOST IMPORTANT RIGHTS WITHIN THE BUNDLE 
When the essential precondition of the right to practice the 
patent has been met, a court moves to the heart of the all 
substantial rights analysis: weighing the various rights within the 
“bundle.”77 Rather than set forth cut and dry rules as to which 
rights a buyer must always hold to possess all substantial rights, the 
Federal Circuit has tended to characterize its analysis as a flexible, 
holistic balancing test.78 However, a clear hierarchy has emerged, 
with a handful of rights weighed most heavily in the court’s 
balancing. As this Article explains below, the right to enforce the 
patent has emerged as the single most important in the Federal 
                                                                                                             
73 Textile Prods., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 134 F.3d 1481, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (observing 
that even if a right-to-enforce “provision were read broadly to give [the buyer] an 
independent right to sue in [the seller’s] name, such a provision would be ineffectual of 
its own force”). 
74 Recall that the core injury that gives rise to constitutional standing to sue for patent 
infringement is a violation of “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering 
for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention 
into the United States.” 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). A party that lacks a right to exclude 
others is not injured by infringement. See supra Part I. 
75 See infra Section V.B. 
76 See infra Section V.B. 
77 See supra text accompanying notes 51–53 for further explanation of this analysis. 
78 See supra Part II. 
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Circuit’s all substantial rights analysis.79 The right to alienate, as 
well as the right to indulge infringement, tend to follow the right to 
enforce in order of importance.80 
A. The Single Most Important Right: The Right to Enforce 
The most important right weighed in the all substantial rights 
analysis is almost certainly the right to enforce. This is not 
surprising given that the ultimate question the all substantial rights 
inquiry addresses is whether the buyer can enforce the patent in its 
own name.81 Meaningful encumbrances on the buyer’s right to sue 
alleged infringers are very likely, if not certain, to preclude transfer 
of all substantial rights and have been found dispositive in several 
cases.82 By contrast, an agreement providing an unfettered right to 
enforce the patent is more likely to be considered as having 
transferred all substantial rights and conferred standing upon the 
buyer.83 The Federal Circuit has stated that, “the exclusive right to 
sue is ‘particularly dispositive’ in cases where . . . we are deciding 
whether a patent owner must be joined as a party.”84 Whether a 
patent owner (i.e., the seller) must be joined as a party essentially 
                                                                                                             
79 See infra Section IV.A. 
80 See infra Sections IV.B–C. 
81 See, e.g., Diamond Coating Techs., LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., 823 F.3d 615, 620 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that “[r]etaining control of [licensing or litigation] activities is [] 
critical to demonstrating that the patent has not been effectively assigned to the licensee”) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Azure Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC, 771 F.3d 1336, 
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 1846 (2015)). 
82 See, e.g., id. at 619–20; Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 
604 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Sicom Sys. Ltd. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 
971, 978–79 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Abbott Labs. v. Diamedix Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 1132  
(Fed. Cir. 1995). 
83 See, e.g., Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1350–51 
(Fed. Cir. 2016). 
84 AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med., LLC, 582 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 
(Fed Cir. 1991)); see also Keranos, LLC v. Silicon Storage Tech., Inc., 797 F.3d 1025, 
1032 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (stating that the right to sue accused infringers is the most 
important factor in determining whether all substantial rights have been transferred); 
Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed Cir. 2006) (“A 
key factor has often been where the right to sue for infringement lies.”). 
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entails the same analysis as whether the buyer has all  
substantial rights.85 
In case after case, the Federal Circuit has held that restrictions 
on a buyer’s ability to sue was at least a significant factor, if not 
the most significant factor, in preventing the transfer of all 
substantial rights in the patent.86 Indeed, to the Authors’ 
knowledge, in every instance where the court has considered an 
agreement that did not provide the buyer with an unfettered right to 
enforce the patent on its own, it has concluded that the buyer did 
not possess all substantial rights.87 
In Abbott Laboratories v. Diamedix Corp., the Federal Circuit 
held that an exclusive licensee possessed less than all substantial 
rights in a patent, given that the licensor reserved the right to sue 
for infringement if the licensee declined to do so, and that the 
licensee was “obligated under the agreement not to ‘prejudice or 
impair the patent rights [of the patentee] in connection with’ [the 
licensee’s own litigation].”88 In holding that the licensee “may not 
sue on its own for infringement,” Abbott quoted Vaupel 
Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A. for the rule 
that transfer of the exclusive right to sue is “particularly 
dispositive.”89 In Sicom Systems Ltd. v. Agilent Technologies, Inc., 
the Federal Circuit held that an exclusive licensee possessed fewer 
than all substantial rights in a patent, given, inter alia, that the 
licensor retained a right to sue noncommercial accused infringers, 
having transferred to the licensee only the right to sue commercial 
infringers.90 In Alfred E. Mann Foundation for Scientific Research 
v. Cochlear Corp., the Federal Circuit held that an exclusive 
licensee did not possess all substantial rights in the patent, in light 
                                                                                                             
85 See, e.g., AsymmetRx, 582 F.3d at 1319–20 (noting how the buyer must have all 
substantial rights in the patent to bring suit on its own without the seller  
(i.e., patent owner)). 
86 Diamond Coating Techs., 823 F.3d at 620–21; Alfred E. Mann, 604 F.3d at 1362; 
Sicom Sys., 427 F.3d at 978–79; Abbott Labs., 47 F.3d at 1132. 
87 See generally supra notes 82–84 (cataloguing various cases on how an exclusive 
right to sue affects an all substantial rights determination). 
88 Abbott Labs., 47 F.3d at 1132 (quoting the agreement at issue in the case). 
89 Id. (quoting Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 875) (citing Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 875–76). 
90 427 F.3d at 978–80. 
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of the fact that the patentee reserved the right to sue for 
infringement if the licensee declined to do so.91 
One case, Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., looks at first glance as 
if it might be an outlier.92 In Speedplay, the buyer did not obtain an 
unfettered right to enforce the patent, as the seller retained some 
rights to sue, but the court nonetheless held that the buyer 
possessed all substantial rights.93 The Federal Circuit held that the 
seller’s retained rights were irrelevant because the buyer possessed 
the ability to grant royalty-free licenses at will to any party sued by 
the seller.94 
By contrast, an absence of restrictions on a buyer’s ability to 
sue has consistently been found by the Federal Circuit to indicate 
the transfer of all substantial rights in the patent.95 Notably, in 
Vaupel the seller retained numerous rights, including: “1) [A] veto 
right on sublicensing . . . ; 2) the right to obtain patents on the 
invention in other countries; 3) a reversionary right to the patent in 
                                                                                                             
91 604 F.3d at 1362; see also, e.g., Diamond Coating Techs., 823 F.3d at 620–21 
(noting that the seller retained significant control over the buyer’s enforcement and 
litigation activities, and concluding on the basis of this and other factors that fewer than 
all substantial rights had been transferred); Clouding IP, LLC v. Google Inc., 61 F. Supp. 
3d 421, 434 (D. Del. 2014) (holding that an exclusive licensee possessed fewer than all 
substantial rights in a patent, given that, inter alia, the licensor could “circumvent [the 
licensee’s] decision to allow infringement and, instead, bring suit directly as a  
counter-plaintiff”). 
92 211 F.3d 1245, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. (“[The sellers’] right to sue an infringer if [the buyer] does not is illusory, 
because [the buyer] can render that right nugatory by granting the alleged infringer a 
royalty-free sublicense.”) 
95 See, e.g., Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1350 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that “the transfer of the right to sue for infringement is critical” 
and holding that an exclusive licensee possessed all substantial rights in view of the fact 
that the patentee, “has not retained the right to sue here”); Keranos, LLC v. Silicon 
Storage Tech., Inc., 797 F.3d 1025, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Importantly, [the assignor] 
did not retain the right to sue accused infringers, which ‘is the most important factor in 
determining whether an exclusive license transfers sufficient rights to render the licensee 
the owner of the patent.’” (quoting Alfred E. Mann, 604 F.3d at 1361)); Vaupel 
Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(noting that “[t]he agreements also transferred the right to sue for infringement of the . . . 
patent, subject only to the obligation to inform [the seller]” and holding that all 
substantial rights had, in fact, been transferred). 
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the event of bankruptcy or termination of production . . . ; and 4) a 
right to receive infringement damages, . . .” Nonetheless, the 
court—focusing on the “particularly dispositive” right to enforce—
held that all substantial rights had been transferred to the buyer.96 
Thus, a potentially useful practice point emerges from the case 
law on the right to enforce. If the parties intend to transfer 
ownership, an agreement should transfer from seller to buyer the 
sole and undivided right to sue for infringement and to defend the 
patent. With some exceptions, the seller should not retain a right to 
veto or otherwise interfere with the buyer’s infringement litigation. 
However, as this Article explains in Section V.B, the Federal 
Circuit has held that a seller may retain certain rights to grant 
licenses or releases to parties accused of infringement, without 
precluding the transfer of all substantial rights. For example, when 
a patent is assigned or ownership is otherwise transferred, the 
patent remains subject to pre-existing licenses and other 
obligations, which can include a licensee’s right to  
grant sublicenses.97 
B. The Right to Alienate 
After the right to enforce, the hierarchy of the remaining rights 
within the bundle is less clear. However, the buyer’s right to 
alienate (e.g., to sell, transfer, or reassign) its rights is arguably the 
next most important consideration. Agreements that restrict a 
buyer’s right to alienate are unlikely to transfer all substantial 
rights, although such restrictions are less certain to be 
determinative than restrictions on the right to enforce. 
In Abbott, the court noted that a licensor (Diamedix) had 
retained “the right to prevent Abbott from assigning its rights 
under the license to any party other than a successor in business,” 
and held that such a right is of “the sort that are commonly held 
sufficient to make a patent owner who grants an exclusive license a 
necessary party to an infringement action brought by the 
licensee.”98 Thus Abbott seems to hold that restrictions on a 
                                                                                                             
96 944 F.2d at 875. 
97 See infra Section V.B. 
98 47 F.3d 1128, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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buyer’s right to alienate its rights in the patent make the seller a 
necessary party (and the buyer the holder of less than all 
substantial rights in the patent).99 In Sicom, the licensor’s retention 
of a right to veto an exclusive licensee’s attempts to reassign its 
license was concordantly a factor in finding that all substantial 
rights had not been transferred.100 But in Intellectual Property 
Development, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of California, Inc., the court 
held that all substantial rights had been transferred to an exclusive 
licensee even though the licensor retained, inter alia, the right to 
prevent the licensee from assigning its license without the 
licensor’s written consent.101 Therefore, although the right to 
alienate is arguably the next most important consideration in the all 
substantial rights analysis, it is not always dispositive.102 
C. The Right to Indulge Infringement 
Compared to the right to sue for infringement—which, as noted 
above, is of paramount importance—the Federal Circuit has been 
less clear on the importance of the right to indulge103 (i.e., to 
permit) infringement. The right not to enforce the patent could be 
viewed as the flip side of the right-to-enforce coin, and at least one 
case has implied that it may be of equal importance.104 In Abbott, 
the Federal Circuit specifically enumerated restrictions on the 
buyer’s right to indulge infringement—the seller’s retained “right 
to bring suit on the patents if [the buyer] declined to do so”—as 
well as limits on the buyer’s ability to alienate its patent rights, and 
the seller’s ongoing “right to make, use, and sell products 
                                                                                                             
99 See id. 
100 See Sicom Sys. Ltd. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
101 See Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
102 See id. 
103 The right to indulge infringement may be viewed as the right to waive the right to 
enforce and thereby, permit infringement to go unpunished. “Implicit in the right to 
exclude is the ability to waive that right . . . .” Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 
F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
104 See Abbott Labs., 47 F.3d at 1132 (observing that “the right to indulge 
infringements . . . normally accompanies a complete conveyance of the right to sue”); see 
also Sicom Sys., 427 F.3d at 978 (noting the holding in Abbott Labs). 
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embodying the patented inventions,” in concluding that all 
substantial rights had not been transferred.105 
Following Abbott, the Federal Circuit considered in Alfred E. 
Mann an exclusive license agreement that gave the patent owner a 
right to bring an infringement suit on its own if the licensee 
declined to do so.106 “[I]f [exclusive licensee] AB declined to bring 
an infringement action against an infringer, [assignee] AMF was 
permitted to file suit.”107 The Federal Circuit held that “[b]ecause 
AB cannot indulge infringements for an unlimited time . . . AB 
holds substantially less than the complete right to sue.”108 The 
Alfred E. Mann decision concluded that the exclusive licensee’s 
inability to indulge infringement for an unlimited time made it 
possess “substantially less than the complete right to sue.”109 
In the same vein, in Diamond Coating Technologies the 
Federal Circuit addressed an agreement that limited the buyer’s 
“discretion to refrain from suing certain companies,” as evidenced 
by, for example, a list of companies included within the agreement 
“which [the buyer] ‘reserves the right not to assert the [patents-in-
suit] against.’”110 The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court 
that, “if [the buyer] has unfettered discretion on enforcement, then 
[the list] would be superfluous.”111 The agreement in Diamond 
Coating Technologies further included a “list of ‘companies that 
[the seller] reasonably believes represent licensing opportunities’ 
and restrict[ed] [the buyer’s] ability to remove companies from 
that list.”112 The Federal Circuit considered such restrictions on the 
                                                                                                             
105 47 F.3d at 1132, 1133. 
106 See Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
107 Id. at 1363. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. (“Thus, AMF’s retained right to sue is significant, and so we hold that the license 
agreement was not a virtual assignment of the patents-in-suit to AB.”). 
110 Diamond Coating Techs., LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., 823 F.3d 615, 621 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Diamond Coating Techs., LLC v. Hyundai Motor 
Am., Nos. 8:13–cv–01480–MRP, 8:13–cv–01481–MRP(DFM), 2015 WL 2088892, at *6 
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2015)). 
111 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Diamond Coating Techs., 2015 WL 
2088892, at *6). 
112 Id. (quoting agreement at issue in the case, marked J.A. 249, 256). 
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right to indulge infringement to limit the right to enforce—namely, 
a provision granting the buyer the right to enforce the patent in its 
“reasonable sole discretion,” and requiring it to take into 
consideration the best interests of the seller in bringing suit.113 The 
court concluded that, together, “[t]hese provisions show that [the 
seller] retained significant control over [the buyer’s] enforcement 
and litigation activities.”114 
However, there are perhaps not yet enough cases addressing 
the significance of the right to indulge infringement to confirm that 
its importance places it in the same elite class as the right to 
enforce. What is clear is that an absence of restrictions on the 
buyer’s right to indulge infringement support a conclusion that all 
substantial rights have been transferred to the buyer. 
V. LESS IMPORTANT RIGHTS WITHIN THE BUNDLE 
Beyond the rights to enforce, alienate, and indulge 
infringement, the Federal Circuit has tended to place less emphasis 
on the remaining rights within the bundle. For example, the court 
has tended to find that all substantial rights have been transferred 
even when the seller retains a monetary interest in the patent, or 
when the seller retains a license to practice the patent itself.115 
A. The Seller’s Retained Monetary Interest 
In its recent decision Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown 
Electronics Co., the Federal Circuit held, rather unequivocally, that 
a seller’s ongoing “financial interest in litigation and licensing 
without more does not amount to a substantial right forcing joinder 
of the patentee.”116 Luminara made clear that provisions granting a 
seller continuing monetary interests of various types, including 
interests in both licensing revenues and any damages collected 
from infringement litigation, are consistent with an assignment of 
                                                                                                             
113 Id. at 620 (quoting agreement at issue in the case, marked J.A. 209). 
114 Id. at 621. 
115 See infra Sections V.A–C. 
116 814 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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the patent, rather than a mere license.117 This decision perhaps 
reflects a modern understanding that the parties may want to 
structure an agreement such that the consideration paid by the 
buyer is contingent, at least in part, on the revenues the buyer is 
able to extract from the patent. However, the origins of this rule 
date back to the Federal Circuit’s foundational Vaupel decision, 
holding that “the right to receive infringement damages” was not 
substantial enough “to reduce the transfer to a mere license or 
indicate an intent not to transfer all substantial rights.”118 Indeed, 
this rule is grounded in the Supreme Court’s 1889 Rude v. Westcott 
decision, which held that a seller’s continued share in a portion of 
“sales, royalties, or settlements, or other source . . . does not, in any 
respect, modify or limit the absolute transfer of title.”119 
In Luminara, patentee Disney negotiated an exclusive license 
to certain patents with licensee Luminara, then called Candella.120 
Disney (and its affiliates) retained certain rights, including “the 
right . . . to practice the patents; title to the patents; the 
responsibility to pay maintenance fees to keep the patents in force; 
a financial interest in litigation and licensing; and a right to notice 
of litigation and licensing activities.”121 The court held that 
Luminara nonetheless possessed all substantial rights in the 
patents, and that “[n]one of [the] retained rights individually or 
cumulatively are substantial enough to preclude Luminara from 
bringing suit in its name alone.”122 
Similarly, in Intellectual Property Development, the Federal 
Circuit held that all substantial rights had not been transferred to 
the buyer, despite the seller’s retention of, inter alia, a right to 
                                                                                                             
117 See id. 
118 Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 
(Fed. Cir. 1991); see also, e.g., Propat Int’l Corp. v. RPost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1191 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he fact that a patent owner has retained a right to a portion of the 
proceeds of the commercial exploitation of the patent . . . does not necessarily defeat 
what would otherwise be a transfer of all substantial rights in the patent.”). 
119 130 U.S. 152, 162–63 (1889). 
120 814 F.3d at 1346. 
121 Id. at 1351. 
122 Id. 
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share in any profits realized from litigation.123 In Vaupel, the court 
considered a provision that required the buyer to pay to the seller 
“‘any money damages obtained from third parties based on 
infringement of [the patent]’ up to a maximum of five percent of 
third party sales,” and held that this provision did not preclude 
transfer of all substantial rights.124 In Bard, the court considered 
that the seller had “retained the right to share in damages” as a 
factor in concluding that all substantial rights had not been 
transferred.125 The seller in Bard also imposed “a field of use 
restriction” on the buyer’s right to practice the patent.126 As noted 
above, the Federal Circuit has elsewhere held that a field of use 
restriction is “fatal” to the transfer of all substantial rights.127 
B. The Seller’s Retained Right to Practice and to (Sub)license 
Like a seller’s retained financial interest, the Federal Circuit 
has also found that a seller’s retained right to practice does not 
preclude the transfer of all substantial rights.128 This is true even 
when the seller reserves the right not only to practice the patent 
itself, but to license or sublicense to affiliates, such as those with 
whom it has a limited business relationship (i.e., a  
franchise agreement).129 
As an initial matter, it is clear that a seller’s retained right to 
practice a patent does not prevent a buyer from becoming an 
exclusive licensee with constitutional standing to sue. In the 
Supreme Court’s 1926 decision, Independent Wireless Telegraph 
                                                                                                             
123 See 248 F.3d 1333, 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
124 Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875–76 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoting agreement at issue in the case); see also Suffolk Techs. LLC v. 
AOL Inc., 910 F. Supp. 2d 850, 857 (E.D. Va. 2012) (addressing a buyer’s obligation “to 
pay to [the seller] [fifty-percent] of adjusted gross proceeds earned on” the patent and 
holding that “[t]his obligation also represents [the seller’s] compensation for assigning 
[the patent] to [the buyer] and is ‘not inconsistent with an assignment.’” (quoting Vaupel, 
944 F.2d at 875)). 
125 776 F.3d 837, 843 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
126 Id. 
127 Alps S., LLC v. Ohio Willow Wood Co., 787 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
128 See Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1351  
(Fed. Cir. 2016). 
129 See id. 
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Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, the original patentee granted an 
exclusive license to its patent but “reserve[ed] to itself non[-
]exclusive, non[-]transferable, and personal rights to make, use, 
and sell [patented devices] for defined purposes.”130 The Court 
held that the licensee was nonetheless an exclusive licensee with 
standing to sue for infringement alongside the patentee  
as co-plaintiff.131 
As noted in Part II, an exclusive license does not necessarily 
confer prudential standing or the right to bring suit absent the 
patent owner.132 There is a separate question of whether a seller’s 
retained rights to practice and to sublicense a patent could preclude 
transfer of all substantial rights in the patent. Luminara addressed 
this issue in some depth and expressly concluded that the answer is 
no: A seller’s retained rights to practice and to sublicense to 
affiliates are significantly less important in the all substantial rights 
analysis than a seller’s retained right to enforce the patent, and do 
not preclude the transfer of all substantial rights.133 As noted 
above, in Luminara the patentee, Disney, granted Luminara an 
exclusive license but retained “the right for Disney Enterprises and 
its Affiliates to practice the patents.”134 Disney’s licensed 
“Affiliates” included “any other entity, theme park, or venue 
operated by or under license from The Walt Disney Company or 
any of its Affiliates.”135 This category encompassed third parties 
with a license from Disney that “relate[d] to the operation of the 
Affiliate in some way, such as with a franchise agreement.”136 The 
court in Luminara concluded that Disney’s retained right to 
practice the patents and to sublicense to third-party affiliates did 
not preclude a transfer of all substantial rights: “[T]his is not a 
substantial right requiring joinder . . . . The retained right to 
practice a patent is not the same as a retained right to exclude 
                                                                                                             
130 269 U.S. 459, 461 (1926). 
131 See id. at 468. 
132 See supra Section I.B. 
133 See 814 F.3d at 1351. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 1348 (quoting agreement at issue in case, marked J.A. 420). 
136 Id. at 1349. 
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others from doing so.”137 Thus the seller’s retained right to practice 
is clearly not dispositive. 
The Luminara court did note that a seller’s retention of an 
unfettered right to sublicense the patent to any and all third parties 
would be inconsistent with the transfer of all substantial rights to 
the buyer: “[I]f the patentee has retained the right to freely license 
the patent, it stands to lose substantial rights if the claims are held 
invalid or the patent held unenforceable.”138 At the same time, 
Luminara sets forth a rule as to the type of sublicensing rights a 
seller may retain: A patent owner may generally sell a patent 
subject to a reserved right to practice the patent, and a reserved 
right to sublicense the patent to parties with whom it has a limited 
business relationship (such as a franchisor/franchisee relationship), 
without preventing the transfer of all substantial rights.139 Beyond 
this rule, Luminara suggests that the more limited a seller’s 
retained right to sublicense to new third parties, the less likely this 
retained right will interfere with transfer of all substantial rights.140 
                                                                                                             
137 Id. at 1351. In certain other cases, the Federal Circuit has considered a seller’s 
retained right to practice and concluded that all substantial rights had not been 
transferred. However, these cases can be squared with Luminara by observing that other, 
more important factors were present in these cases. In Abbott, the Federal Circuit 
weighed the fact that the seller “retained a limited right to make, use, and sell products 
embodying the patented inventions,” in concluding that “[u]nder Waterman and its 
successors, Abbott . . . may not sue on its own for infringement.” 47 F.3d 1128, 1132 
(Fed. Cir. 1995). But the seller in Abbott had also limited the buyer’s rights to enforce 
and to alienate the patents. Id. “Unlike in Vaupel, [the seller in Abbott] retained . . . a 
right to bring suit on the patents if Abbott declined to do so, and the right to prevent 
Abbott from assigning its rights under the license to any party other than a successor in 
business.” Id.; see also Fieldturf, Inc. v. Sw. Recreational Indus., Inc., 357 F.3d 1266, 
1269 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that “the licensor’s retention of a limited right to develop 
and market the patented invention indicates that the licensee failed to acquire all 
substantial rights,” while the agreement in question also failed to grant the licensee any 
right to enforce the patent). 
138 Luminara, 814 F.3d at 1350. 
139 See id. at 1348 (noting that Luminara, at the time called Candella, would have 
limited rights if Disney Enterprises were given the right to license to any entity). 
140 See id. 
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C. Even Less Significant Rights 
Remaining rights within the “bundle” tend to be less significant 
and will therefore be analyzed in less depth. While these rights 
may be weighed in the court’s analysis, they are unlikely to be 
determinative. These rights include reversionary rights possessed 
by the seller and restrictions on the buyer’s ability to license  
the patent. 
As to reversionary rights, the Federal Circuit has held that a 
“reversion of rights to the [seller] following breaches of the license 
agreement” is a factor that weighs to some extent against finding 
that all substantive rights were conveyed to the buyer.141 Yet the 
court also held that “a reversionary right to the patent in the event 
of bankruptcy or termination of production by” the buyer is not a 
right “so substantial as to reduce the transfer to a mere license or 
indicate an intent not to transfer all substantial rights.”142 That is, a 
provision mandating the reversion of patent rights to the seller in 
the event of the buyer’s failure to make payment, or another breach 
of the agreement, does not preclude the transfer of all substantial 
rights and is merely a factor in the analysis. By contrast, as noted 
in Part IV, a hard termination date upon which the buyer’s rights 
revert to the seller clearly precludes the transfer of all  
substantial rights.143 
As to restrictions on a buyer’s ability to license, Vaupel 
considered a seller’s retained “veto right on sublicensing by” the 
buyer and concluded that this did not prevent the transfer of all 
substantial rights.144 This demonstrates that a seller’s right to 
interfere with a buyer’s licensing activity does not  
necessarily control. 
                                                                                                             
141 Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 1360–
61 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
142 Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 
(Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 257–61 (1891) 
(holding that assignment of a patent “subject to [a] mortgage” and reversionary interest 
did not prevent transfer of title). 
143 See Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1343  
(Fed. Cir. 2006). 
144 944 F.2d at 875. 
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A practice point emerges from this Part—a seller of patent 
rights may retain a rather large array of “less important” rights, 
including a right to practice, a right to license or sublicense, and a 
monetary interest in the patent, without precluding transfer of 
effective patent ownership to the buyer. 
VI. THE (UN)IMPORTANCE OF FORM 
Having discussed the rights commonly considered in a court’s 
analysis of whether all substantial rights have been transferred and 
having identified the most important rights in that analysis, this 
Article turns to the question of form—that is, the form of the 
agreement that transfers patent rights between parties, whether it 
be a license, an assignment, or another agreement. For example, 
does it matter if a particular right is reserved by the seller of a 
patent, rather than transferred to the buyer and then granted back to 
the seller? 
The case law generally instructs that it is the substance of the 
agreement, and not its form, that controls. As noted above, the 
Supreme Court held in 1891 that, “[w]hether a transfer of a 
particular right or interest under a patent is an assignment or a 
license does not depend upon the name by which it calls itself, but 
upon the legal effect of its provisions.”145 The Federal Circuit has 
reiterated this rule: “In determining ownership for purposes of 
standing, labels given by the parties do not control. Rather, the 
court must determine whether the party alleging effective 
ownership has in fact received all substantial rights from the  
patent owner.”146 
Under the bundle-of-sticks analogy, the mechanism by which 
each party obtains its respective rights—i.e., by reservation, 
assignment, license, etc.—should not control the substantive 
apportionment of those rights.147 The Federal Circuit has stated 
                                                                                                             
145 Waterman, 138 U.S. at 256. 
146 A123 Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-Quebec, 626 F.3d 1213, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
147 See id. From a purely practical perspective, and entirely separate from the all 
substantial rights and standing question, contracting parties should remember that the 
form of the agreement can sometimes be important, as it affects the operation of the 
508       FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:477 
 
that “[w]e have not allowed labels to control by treating bare 
formalities of ‘title’ transfer as sufficient to determine that an 
‘assignment’ of the entire exclusive right has occurred.”148 Rather, 
the Court explained that, “[t]o determine whether a provision in an 
agreement constitutes an assignment or license, one must . . . 
examine the substance of what was granted.”149 Thus, the answer is 
that it should not matter whether a particular right is reserved by 
the seller of a patent, rather than transferred to the buyer and then 
granted back to the seller; the ultimate allocation of rights is  
what matters. 
CONCLUSION 
To have standing to bring a suit for patent infringement in its 
own name, a party must possess all substantial rights in the patent, 
making it the effective owner—if not the formal owner—of the 
patent.150 While the all substantial rights doctrine gives courts 
discretion to consider the totality of the circumstances, a few key 
considerations have emerged. First, a necessary (but not alone 
sufficient) condition for possession of all substantial rights is an 
unfettered right to practice the patent.151 Second, assuming that this 
condition is met, the single most important right in the court’s 
analysis is the right to enforce the patent (i.e., to bring suit against 
alleged infringers), as any limitations on this right almost certainly 
preclude possession of all substantial rights.152 Third, the right to 
alienate rights held in the patent and the right to indulge 
                                                                                                             
agreement itself. For example, from the seller’s perspective, an agreement structured as a 
grant of rights to the buyer with a license back from the buyer to the seller can be riskier 
than a simple reservation of the same rights. A license could be terminated or set aside 
(e.g., in the event of the buyer’s bankruptcy), whereas a reservation typically operates 
independently of the buyer. Additionally, a license back from buyer to seller must 
necessarily be granted post-assignment, creating a risk in the event that the assignment is 
itself found defective in some way. 
148 Diamond Coating Techs., LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., 823 F.3d 615, 618  
(Fed. Cir. 2016). 
149 Id. (quoting Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 874). 
150 See supra Part I. 
151 See supra Part III. 
152 See supra Section IV.A. 
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infringement have also been found important, at least in certain 
cases.153 Beyond these rights, other rights and interests in the 
patent, including financial interests and a seller’s retained rights to 
practice or sublicense the patent to affiliates, tend to be less 
important.154 Fourth, the form of an agreement transferring patent 
rights is not dispositive, but rather it is the intent of the parties that 
controls.155 To ensure transfer of all substantial rights, it is not 
necessary, but may be helpful, to structure the agreement as an 
assignment rather than as an exclusive license. It may also be 
helpful to state that any rights retained by the seller of the patent 
are not intended to interfere with the buyer’s rights to practice and 
enforce the patent, as these rights are the most important in  
the analysis. 
The Authors hope that in laying out certain rules and trends 
within the Federal Circuit’s all substantial rights doctrine, readers 
will feel confident in structuring an agreement to transfer patent 
rights that will predictably and reliably allocate ownership of  
the patent. 
                                                                                                             
153 See supra Sections IV.B–C. 
154 See supra Part V. 
155 See supra Part VI. 
